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AV\EDR Vectors

EDRs and modern antivirus engines rely on multiple observation vectors to detect malicious behavior. These vectors extend beyond simple file scanning, encompassing dynamic monitoring of process behavior, memory activity, system calls, and telemetry aggregation. Understanding these vectors is essential for designing effective evasion techniques.

Practical Detection Vectors Table

Vector
Monitored By
Used For

Syscalls

Userland Hooks, ETW, Kernel

Process Injection, Exploits

Memory Buffers

Agent Scanner, Kernel Driver

Shellcode, Reflective DLLs

File Access

Sysmon, ETW, File System Hook

Droppers, Stagers

Network

Agent, ETW, NDIS Filter

C2 Detection, DNS Tunneling

Registry

Registry Filter Driver

Persistence, Payload Loading

Process Trees

Kernel + Agent

LOLBAS, Anomalous Behavior

Entropy/Signatures

Static Scanners

Packed Files, Obfuscation

EDRs do not rely on a single vector of detection, but instead combine multiple sources—telemetry, logs, memory, syscall graphs—to build a rich picture of activity. Bypassing them requires multi-layered obfuscation, deep knowledge of Windows internals, and constant adaptation to behavioral analysis engines.

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